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Abstract
There are two conflicting perspectives regarding the relationship between profanity and dishonesty. These two forms of norm-
violating behavior share common causes and are often considered to be positively related. On the other hand, however, profanity
is often used to express one’s genuine feelings and could therefore be negatively related to dishonesty. In three studies, we
explored the relationship between profanity and honesty. We examined profanity and honesty first with profanity behavior and
lying on a scale in the lab (Study 1; N ¼ 276), then with a linguistic analysis of real-life social interactions on Facebook (Study 2;
N ¼ 73,789), and finally with profanity and integrity indexes for the aggregate level of U.S. states (Study 3; N ¼ 50 states). We
found a consistent positive relationship between profanity and honesty; profanity was associated with less lying and deception at
the individual level and with higher integrity at the society level.
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Frankly my dear, I don’t give a damn.
Gone with the Wind (1939)
Profane as it is, this memorable line by the character Rhett Butler
in the filmGone with theWind profoundly conveys Butler’s hon-
est thoughts and feelings. However, it was the use of this profane
word that led to a US$5,000 fine against the film’s production for
violating the Motion Picture Production Code. This example
reveals the conflicting attitudes that most societies hold toward
profanity, reflected in a heated debate taking place in online for-
ums and media in recent years—with passionate views on both
sides. For example, the website debate.org, which conducts
online polls and elicits general public opinions on popular online
debates, has many comments on the issue, with a 50–50 tie
between the two views (Are people who swear more honest?,
2015). This public debate reflects an interesting question andmir-
rors the academic discussion regarding the nature of profanity.On
the one hand, profane individuals are widely perceived as violat-
ing moral and social codes and thus deemed untrustworthy and
potentially antisocial and dishonest (Jay, 2009). On the other
hand, profane language is considered asmore authentic and unfil-
tered, thusmaking its users appearmore honest and genuine (Jay,
2000). These opposing views on profanity raise the question of
whether profane individuals tend to be more or less dishonest.
Profanity
Profanity refers to obscene language including taboo and
swear words, which in regular social settings are considered
inappropriate and in some situations unacceptable. It often
includes sexual references, blasphemy, objects eliciting dis-
gust, ethnic–racial–gender slurs, vulgar terms, or offensive
slang (Mabry, 1974). The interest in understanding the psycho-
logical roots of the use of profanity dates back to as far as the
early 20th century (Patrick, 1901), yet the literature in this
domain is scattered across different scientific fields with only
recent attempts to connect the findings into a unified frame-
work (Jay, 2009).
The reasons for using profanity depend on the person and
the situation, yet profanity is commonly related to the expres-
sion of emotions such as anger, frustration, or surprise (Jay &
Janschewitz, 2008). The spontaneous use of profanity is usually
the unfiltered genuine expression of emotions, with the most
extreme type being the bursts of profanity (i.e., coprolalia)
accompanying the Tourette syndrome (Cavanna & Rickards,
2013). The more controllable use of profanity often helps to
convey world views or internal states or is used to insult an
object, a view, or a person (Jay, 2009). Speech involving
1Department of Work and Social Psychology, Maastricht University,
Maastricht, the Netherlands
2Department of Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,
Clearwater Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
3Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
4 Judge School of Business, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United
Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Gilad Feldman, Department of Work and Social Psychology, Maastricht
University, Maastricht 6200MD, the Netherlands.
Email: gilad.feldman@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Social Psychological and
Personality Science
1-11
ª The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1948550616681055
journals.sagepub.com/home/spp
profane words has a stronger impact on people than regular
speech and has been shown to be processed on a deeper level
in people’s minds (Jay, Caldwell-Harris, & King, 2008).
The context is important for understanding profanity.
Profanity can sometimes be interpreted as antisocial, harmful,
and abusive—if, for example, intended to harm or convey
aggression and hostile emotions (Stone, McMillan, &
Hazelton, 2015). It also violates the moral foundations of purity
(Sylwester & Purver, 2015) and the common norm for speech,
suggestive of the potential to engage in other antisocial beha-
viors that violate norms and morality. However, profanity may
also be seen as a positive if it does not inflict harm but acts as a
reliever of stress or pain in a cathartic effect (Robbins et al.,
2011; Vingerhoets, Bylsma, & de Vlam, 2013). Profane lan-
guage can serve as a substitute for potentially more harmful
forms of violence (Jay, 2009) and can alert others to one’s own
emotional state or the issues that one cares about deeply (Jay,
2009). Profanity is also used to entertain, attract (Kaye &
Sapolsky, 2009), and influence audiences (Scherer & Sagarin,
2006) as illustrated by the frequent use of profane language in
comedy, mass media, and advertising (Sapolsky & Kaye,
2005). Profanity has even been used by presidential candidates
in American elections (Slatcher, Chung, Pennebaker, & Stone,
2007) as recently illustrated by Donald Trump, who has been
both hailed for authenticity and criticized for moral bankruptcy
(Sopan, 2015).
Dishonesty
In its most basic form, dishonesty involves the conscious
attempt by a person to convince others of a false reality (Abe,
2011). In this work, we operationalize dishonesty as a general-
ized personal inclination to obscure the truth in natural, every-
day life situations. The most common type of such dishonesty
is represented by ‘‘white lies’’ or ‘‘social lies’’ that people tell
themselves or others in order to appear more desirable or pos-
itive (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996;
Granhag & Vrij, 2005). While most people claim to be honest
most of the time (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Halevy, Shalvi, &
Verschuere, 2013), research suggests that minor cases of dis-
honesty are quite common (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Hofmann,
Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014; Serota, Levine, & Boster,
2010), especially when people believe that dishonesty is harm-
less or justifiable (Fang & Casadevall, 2013) or that they can
avoid any penalties (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009). In other
words, people tend to rationalize their own dishonesty (Ayal
& Gino, 2012) and perceive it as less severe (Peer, Acquisti,
& Shalvi, 2014) or nonexistent (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).
The Relationship Between Profanity and Dishonesty
There are two opposing perspectives on the relationship
between profanity and dishonesty. As dishonesty and profanity
are both considered deviant (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) and
immoral (Buchtel et al., 2015), they are generally perceived
as a reflection of a disregard for societal normative
expectations (Kaplan, 1975), low moral standards, lack of
self-control, or negative emotions (Jay, 1992, 2000). In this
regard, profanity appears to be positively related to dishonesty,
explaining why people who swear are perceived as untrust-
worthy (Jay, 1992) and why swear words are often associated
with deceit (Rassin & Van Der Heijden, 2005). Previous work
has also linked the use of swear words to the dark triad per-
sonality traits—namely, narcissism, Machiavellianism, and
psychopathy—all indicative of social deviance and a higher
propensity for dishonesty (Holtzman, Vazire, & Mehl, 2010;
Sumner, Byers, Boochever, & Park, 2012). Swearing has
also been shown to hold a negative relationship with the
personality traits of conscientiousness and agreeableness,
which are considered the more socially aware and moral
aspects of personality (Kalshoven, Den Hartog, & De Hoogh,
2011; Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006; Walumbwa &
Schaubroeck, 2009).
On the other hand, profanity can be positively associated
with honesty. It is often used to express one’s unfiltered feel-
ings (e.g., anger, frustration) and sincerity. Innocent suspects,
for example, are more likely to use swear words than guilty sus-
pects when denying accusations (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, &
Jayne, 2011). Accordingly, people perceive testimonies
containing swear words as more credible (Rassin & Van Der
Heijden, 2005).
The Present Investigation
This work explores the relationship between profanity and
honesty to address the paradoxical perspectives in the exist-
ing literature. Study 1 examined the relationship between
profanity use and honesty on a lie scale. Study 2 examined
behavior in real-life naturalistic setting by analyzing behavior
on Facebook: looking at the relationship between users’
profanity rate and honesty in their online status updates, as
indicated by a linguistic detection of deception. Study 3
extended to society level by exploring the relationship
between state-level profanity rates and state-level integrity.
The Online Supplemental Materials include power analyses,
procedures, and stimuli used in the three studies, and data
and code were made available on the Open Science Frame-
work (https://osf.io/z9jbm/).
Study 1—Honesty on a Lie Scale
We began our investigation with a test for the relationship
between profanity and honesty, captured by a widely used
lie scale.
Method
Participants and Procedure
A total of 307 participants were recruited online using Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Of the sample, 31 participants failed atten-
tion checks (10%) and were excluded from the analysis, leav-
ing a sample of 276 (Mage ¼ 40.71, SDage ¼ 12.75;
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171 females). The exclusion of participants had no significant
impact on the reported effect sizes or p values below. Partici-
pants self-reported profanity use in everyday life: given the
opportunity to use profanity, rated reasons for the use of
profanity, and answered a lie scale.
Measures
Profanity use behavioral measure. In 2 items, participants were
asked to list their most commonly used and favorite profan-
ity words: ‘‘Please list the curse words you [1 – use; 2 –
like] the most (feel free, don’t hold back).’’ By giving par-
ticipants an opportunity to curse freely, we expected that the
daily usage and enjoyment of profanity would be reflected
in the total number of curse words written. Participants’
written profanity was counted and coded by the first author
and a coder unrelated to the project, who was unaware of
the study hypotheses and data structure. The interrater relia-
bility was .91 (95% confidence interval [CI] [.87, .94]) for
most commonly used curse words and .93 (95% CI [.91,
.97]) for favorite curse words, indicating a very high level
of agreement.
Profanity self-reported use. To supplement the behavioral mea-
sures, we also added self-reported use of profanity. Participants
self-reported their everyday use of profanity (Rassin & Muris,
2005) using 3 items: ‘‘How often do you curse (swear/use bad
language)’’ (1) ‘‘verbally in person (face to face),’’ (2) ‘‘in
private (no one around),’’ and (3) ‘‘in writing (e.g., texting/
messaging/posting online/emailing’’; 1 ¼ never, 2 ¼ once a
year or less, 3 ¼ several times a year, 4 ¼ once a month, 5 ¼
2–3 times a month, 6 ¼ once a week, 7 ¼ 2–3 times a week,
8¼ 4–6 times a week, 9¼ daily, 10¼ a few times a day; a¼ .84).
Reasons for profanity use. Following Rassin and Muris (2005),
we also asked participants to rate reasons for their use of
profanity (0 ¼ never a reason for me to swear; 5 ¼ very often
a reason for me to swear) and asked questions regarding
the general perceived reasons for using profanity (0 ¼ not
at all; 5 ¼ to a very large extent; see Online Supplemental
Materials).
Honesty. Honesty was measured using the Lie subscale of the
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised short scale
(Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985). The Lie subscale is one
of the most common measures for assessing individual differ-
ences in lying for socially desirable responding (Paulhus,
1991). The Lie scale includes 12 items, such as ‘‘If you say you
will do something, do you always keep your promise no matter
how inconvenient it might be?’’ and ‘‘Are all your habits good
and desirable ones?’’ (dichotomous Yes/No scale). In these
examples, positive answers are considered unrealistic and
therefore most likely a lie (a¼ .79). The Lie scale was reversed
for the honesty measure.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for the hon-
esty and profanity measures are detailed in Table 1. Honesty
was positively correlated with all profanity measures, meaning
that participants lied less on the Lie scale if they wrote down a
higher number of frequently used (r ¼ .20, p ¼ .001; CI [.08,
.31]) and liked curse words (r ¼ .13, p ¼ .032; CI [.01, .24])
or self-reported higher profanity use in their everyday lives
(r ¼ .34, p < .001; CI [.23, .44]), even when controlling for age
and gender (Behavioral 1: partial r ¼ .20, p ¼ .001; CI [.08,
.31]; Behavior 2: partial r ¼ .12, p ¼ .049; CI [.001, .24];
self-report: partial r ¼ .32, p < .001; CI [.21, .42]).
We asked participants to rate their reasons for use of profan-
ity. The reasons that received the highest ratings were the
expression of negative emotions (M ¼ 4.09, SD ¼ 1.33), habit
(M ¼ 3.08, SD ¼ 1.82), and an expression of true self
(M ¼ 2.17, SD ¼ 1.73). Participants also indicated that in their
personal experience, profanity was used for being more honest
about their feelings (M¼ 2.69, SD¼ 1.72) and dealing with their
negative emotions (M ¼ 2.57, SD ¼ 1.64). Profanity received a
lower rating as a tool for insulting others (M ¼ 1.41, SD¼ 1.53)
as well as for being perceived as intimidating or insulting
(M ¼ 1.12, SD ¼ 1.36). This supports the view that people
regard profanity more as a tool for the expression of their genu-
ine emotions rather than being antisocial and harmful.
Study 2—Naturalistic Deceptive Behavior on Facebook
Study 1 provided initial support for a positive relationship
between profanity use and honesty, with the limitations of lab
Table 1. Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Variables.
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Honesty 7.63 3.00 (.79)
2. Profanity self-report 6.51 2.56 .34*** (.84)
3. Profanity behavioral 1 4.09 2.61 .20** .46*** (—)
4. Profanity behavioral 2 1.60 1.62 .13* .41*** .45*** (—)
5. Age 40.71 12.75 .13* .34*** .05 .08 (—)
6. Gender 1.62 0.49 .06 .03 .07 .04 .08
Note. N¼ 276. Gender coding: 1¼male, 2¼ female. Scale a coefficients are on the diagonal. Profanity behavioral 1¼ number of most frequently used curse words
written; profanity behavioral 2 ¼ number of most liked curse words written.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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settings. Study 2 was constructed to extend Study 1 to a natur-
alistic setting—using a larger sample, more accurate measures
of real-life use of profanity, and a different honesty measure.
With a stellar growth, Facebook has become the world’s
most dominant social network and is strongly embedded in its
users’ overall social lives (Manago, Taylor, & Greenfield,
2012; Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). Online social net-
working sites such as Facebook now serve as an extension of
real-life social context, allowing individuals to express their
actual selves (Back et al., 2010). Facebook profiles have been
found to provide fairly accurate portrayals of their users’ per-
sonalities and behaviors (Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel,
2013; Schwartz et al., 2013; Wang, Kosinski, Stillwell, & Rust,
2012), including socially undesirable aspects (Garcia &
Sikstro¨m, 2014), such as self-promotion (Waggoner, Smith,
& Collins, 2009; Weisbuch, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2009), narcis-
sism (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008), and low self-esteem
(Zywica & Danowski, 2008).
In this work, we detected dishonesty by analyzing
Facebook users’ status updates that were used to broadcast
messages to their online social network. Using language to tap
into people’s psyches dates back to Freud (1901), who ana-
lyzed patients’ slips of the tongue, and Lacan (1968), who
argued that the unconscious manifests itself in language use.
A growing body of literature has since demonstrated that the
language that people use in their daily lives can reveal hidden
aspects of their personalities, cognitions, and behaviors
(Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). The linguistic
approach is especially useful in the case of dishonesty,
which—though prevalent—is frowned upon when detected,
and therefore leads those who are acting dishonestly to try
to hide it from others (Hancock, 2009; Toma, Hancock, &
Ellison, 2008). In the case of Facebook, the dishonesty we
refer to is not necessarily blunt deception aimed at exploiting
or harming others but rather a mild distortion of the truth
intended to construe a more socially desirable appearance
(Whitty, 2002; Whitty & Gavin, 2001).
Method
Participants and Procedure
A total of 153,716 participants were recruited using the
myPersonality Facebook application (Kosinski, Matz,
Gosling, Popov, & Stillwell, 2015). Participants voluntarily
chose to use this application and provided opt-in consent to
record their Facebook profiles, including demographic data
and their status updates (more information about the myPer-
sonality Facebook application is available at http://myperso
nality.org). This analysis is limited to users who used the
English version of Facebook, had more than 50 Facebook
status updates, and had more than 30 friends (an indication
of being an active Facebook user). The final sample
included 73,789 participants (62.0% female, Mage ¼ 25.34,
Mnetwork size ¼ 272.37; Mstatus updates ¼ 201.28, SDstatus updates
¼ 167.33;M
words
¼ 3,181.82, SDwords ¼ 3,014.44).
Measures
We used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC Version
2007; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) in order to analyze parti-
cipants’ status updates. The analysis was conducted by aggre-
gating all the status updates of every participant into a single
file and executing a LIWC analysis on each user’s combined
status updates. The LIWC software reported the percentages
of the words in each LIWC category out of all of the words
used in the combined status updates, as follows:
LIWC category rate user X
¼ User Xword count for LIWC category in all status updates
UserXword count in all status updates
:
Honesty. The honesty of the status updates written by the parti-
cipants was assessed following the approach introduced by
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, and Richards (2003) using
LIWC. Their analyses showed that liars use fewer first-
person pronouns (e.g., I, me), fewer third-person pronouns
(e.g., she, their), fewer exclusive words (e.g., but, exclude),
more motion verbs (e.g., arrive, go), and more negative words
(e.g., worried, fearful; Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, &
Richards, 2003). The explanation was that dishonest people
subconsciously try to (1) dissociate themselves from the lie and
therefore refrain from referring to themselves, (2) prefer con-
crete over abstract language when referring to others (using
someone’s name instead of ‘‘he’’ or ‘‘she’’), (3) are likely to
feel discomfort by lying and therefore express more negative
feelings, and (4) require more mental resources to obscure the
lie and therefore end up using less cognitively demanding lan-
guage, which is characterized by a lower frequency of exclu-
sive words and a higher frequency of motion verbs. Equation
and usage rates in this study are summarized in Table 2.
Newman et al. (2003) achieved up to 67% accuracy when
detecting lies, which was significantly higher than the 52%
near-chance accuracy achieved by human judges. Their
approach has been successfully applied to behavioral data
(Slatcher et al., 2007) and to Facebook status updates
(Feldman, Chao, Farh, & Bardi, 2015). Other studies have
since found support for these LIWC dimensions as being
indicative of lying and dishonesty (Bond & Lee, 2005;
Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2007; see
meta-analyses by DePaulo et al., 2003 and Hauch, Masip,
Blando´n-Gitlin, & Sporer, 2012).
To calculate the honesty score, we first computed LIWC
scores to obtain participants’ use rate of first-person pronouns,
third-person pronouns, exclusive words, motion verbs, and
anxiety words and then applied average regression coefficients
from Newman et al. (2003). Here, we note that we focused on
anxiety words rather than general negative words (which
include anxiety, anger, and sadness) due to two considerations.
First, it has been suggested that anxiety words may be more
predictive of honesty than overall negative emotions (Newman
et al., 2003). Second, measuring honesty using negative emo-
tions with anger words may bias the profanity–honesty
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correlations because anger has been shown to have a strong
positive relation with profanity. Holtzman et al. (2010)
reported a correlation of .96 between anger and profanity, and
Yarkoni (2010) found swearing to be strongly associated with
anger but not with anxiety, which is not surprising given the
conclusion by Jay and Janschewitz (2008) that profanity is
mostly used to express anger.1
Profanity. We used the LIWC dictionary of swear words
(e.g., damn, piss, fuck) to obtain the participants’ use rate
of profanity. This approach was previously used to ana-
lyze swearing patterns in social contexts (e.g., Holtgraves,
2011; Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003). Profanity use rates were
calculated per each participant using LIWC, with rates
indicating the percentage of swear words used in all status
updates by the participant overall. Profanity use rates
were then log-transformed to normalize distribution
(ln[profanity þ 1]).
Results
The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of all vari-
ables are provided in Table 3. The mean of profanity use was
0.37% (SD ¼ 0.43%; 7,969 [10.8%] used no profanity at all),
which is in line with previous findings (Jay, 2009). Profanity
and honesty were found to be significantly and positively cor-
related (N ¼ 73,789; r ¼ .20, p < .001; 95% CI [.19, .21]; see
Figure 1 for an aggregated plot), indicating that those who used
more profanity were more honest in their Facebook status
updates. Controlling for age, gender, and network size resulted
in a slightly stronger effect (partial r ¼ .22, p < .001; 95% CI
[.21, .22]).
Study 3—State-Level Integrity
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that the use of profanity is a pre-
dictor of honesty at the individual level. Study 3 sought to
extend these findings by taking a broader view and examining
the possible implications that individual differences in use of
profanity have for society (as suggested by Back & Vazire,
2015). If the use of profanity is indeed positively related to hon-
esty, then it can be argued that societies with higher profanity
rates may be characterized by a higher appreciation for honesty
and genuineness. Study 3 examined whether the state-level use
of profanity is predictive of state-level integrity as reported by
the State Integrity Index 2012.
Measures
State-level profanity. State-level profanity scores were computed
by averaging the profanity scores of the American participants
in Study 2 (29,701 participants) across the states. The state
profanity scores are detailed in Table 4.
State-level integrity. State-level integrity was obtained from the
State Integrity Investigation 2012 (SSI2012), the year that the
myPersonality data collection was concluded. Estimating state
levels of integrity and corruption is a complicated and contro-
versial issue. For example, corruption was sometimes mea-
sured with the number of corruption convictions per state, yet
a higher conviction rate can be indicative of better policing and
thus lower corruption. We therefore used an index of integrity
that is less affected by possible conflicting interpretations of
crime and conviction statistics: the SSI2012. The SSI2012
ranks the states on 14 broad integrity criteria, including stance
on honesty and transparency; the presence of independent
Table 3. Study 2: Descriptive Statistics of Honesty, Profanity, and Demographics.
Variables Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Honesty Profanity Age Gender
Honesty (raw) 0 (1.60) 1 (0.60) 0.03 0.02 (—) .22
Profanity (raw) 0.28 (0.37) 0.26 (0.43) 1.37 (2.51) 2.00 (9.49) .20 (—)
Age 25.34 8.78 1.90 3.96 .05 .18 (—)
Gender 0.62 0.49 0.49 1.76 .12 .23 .08 (—)
Network size (raw) 5.30 (272.37) 0.79 (249.71) 0.03 (4.18) 0.25 (39.82) .18 .09 .13 .00 (ns)
Note.Gender coding: 0¼male, 1¼ female. ns indicates a nonsignificant correlation coefficient; remaining coefficients were significant at p < .001 level; honesty was
standardized; profanity and network size were log transformed. Males used more profanity than females, d ¼ .12 [0.12, 0.13], t(4,6884.67) ¼ 59.26, p < .001,
d ¼ .47, and were less honest, d ¼ 0.14 [0.15, 0.13], t ¼ 31.69, p < .001, d ¼ 0.23. Raw lines indicate statistics for variables before transformations
or standardizing. Values above the diagonal are partial correlations controlling for age, gender, and network size.
Table 2. Study 2: Word Analysis of LIWC Categories and Key Words.
LIWC Dimensions Sample LIWC Key Words Honesty Coefficients bs Percentage (M, %) Percentage (SD, %)
First-person pronouns I, me, mine .260 4.21 1.71
Third-person pronouns She, her, him, they, their .250 0.84 0.33
Exclusive words But, without, exclude .419 1.78 0.63
Motion verbs Arrive, car, go .259 1.57 0.53
Anxiety words Worried, fearful, nervous .217 0.21 0.14
Note. LIWC ¼ Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count.
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ethics commissions; and executive, legislative, and judicial
accountability. State integrity scores are detailed in Table 4.
More information about how the State Integrity scores were
obtained can be found in the Online Supplemental Materials.
Results
A scatterplot of profanity and integrity rates for all states is pro-
vided in Figure 2. We found a positive relationship between
profanity and integrity on a state level (N ¼ 50; r ¼ .35, p ¼
.014; CI [.08, .57]). States with a higher profanity rate had a
higher integrity score.2 For example, two of the three states
with the highest profanity rate, Connecticut and New Jersey,
were also two of the three states with the highest integrity
scores on the index.
We also conducted a spatial regression analysis to address
possible spatial-dependence regional confounds (Ward &
Gleditsch, 2008). We calculated spatial distance matrices
(Merryman, 2008) for the distance between states’ centroids
using the following formula for Euclidean distance between
State A and State B (y and x denote the y coordinate and x coor-
dinate, respectively):
dðxA; yA; xB; yBÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðyA  yBÞ2 þ ðxA  xBÞ2
q
:
We then inverted the distances (1/X) to form a proximity
measure, multiplied the proximity matrix by the state profanity
column, and divided by the sum to create a measure of spatial
lag—a spatial weighted profanity per each state (Webster &
Duffy, 2016). Excluding Hawaii and Alaska for their geogra-
phical isolation, the spatial profanity measure had a correlation
of r¼ .55 with the state profanity measure (n¼ 48; p < .001; CI
[.32, .72]; Moran I statistic ¼ .15, p < .001), indicative of spa-
tial dependence. After controlling for the spatial profanity, the
partial correlation between profanity and integrity was r ¼ .33
(p ¼ .025, CI [.05, .56]).
Figure 1. Study 2: the relationship between profanity and honesty (Model 2). The first two scatterplots are of two randomly chosen 1% subsets
of the total population (Plot 1: n ¼ 750; Plot 2: n ¼ 721). The third graph is a plot of aggregated honesty groups, and average profanity was
computed for five equal groups of participants based on their honesty. The honesty score was standardized to the mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1. Error bars indicate a 95% confidence interval. The profanity rate is in percentages (e.g., 0.25 is 0.25% use).
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General Discussion
We examined the relationship between the use of profanity
and dishonesty and showed that profanity is positively cor-
related with honesty at an individual level and with integ-
rity at a society level. Table 5 provides a summary of the
results. Study 1 showed that participants with higher
profanity use were more honest on a lie scale, and in Study
2, profanity was associated with more honest language pat-
terns in Facebook status updates. In Study 3, state-level
profane language usage was positively related to state-
level integrity.
Challenges in Studying Profanity and Dishonesty
in Naturalistic Settings
The empirical investigation of the relationship between dishon-
esty and profanity poses a unique challenge. The behavioral
ethics literature has been successful in devising ways to exam-
ine unethical behavior in the lab, yet observing dishonesty and
unethical behavior in the field remains an ongoing challenge,
and so far only a few studies were able to devise innovative
methods to overcome that challenge (e.g., Hofmann et al.,
2014; Piff, Stancato, Coˆte´, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner,
2012). The indirect linguistic approach for the detection of
Table 4. Study 3: State-Level Profanity and Integrity Rates.
State Profanity Rate Integrity State Profanity Rate Integrity State Profanity Rate Integrity
Alabama 34 72 Maine 33 56 Oregon 36 73
Alaska 42 68 Maryland 46 61 Pennsylvania 42 71
Arizona 41 68 Massachusetts 46 74 Rhode Island 44 74
Arkansas 29 68 Michigan 41 58 South Carolina 29 57
California 44 81 Minnesota 39 69 South Dakota 38 50
Colorado 39 67 Mississippi 33 79 Tennessee 32 76
Connecticut 52 86 Missouri 37 72 Texas 38 68
Delaware 51 70 Montana 35 68 Utah 26 65
Florida 41 71 Nebraska 42 80 Vermont 35 69
Georgia 36 49 Nevada 47 60 Virginia 40 55
Hawaii 45 74 New Hampshire 36 66 Washington 36 83
Idaho 31 61 New Jersey 50 87 West Virginia 34 68
Illinois 45 74 New Mexico 34 62 Wisconsin 39 70
Indiana 35 70 New York 46 65 Wyoming 34 52
Iowa 40 87 North Carolina 37 71
Kansas 39 75 North Dakota 37 58
Kentucky 37 71 Ohio 39 66
Louisiana 35 72 Oklahoma 33 64
Note. Integrity is the State Integrity Investigation 2012 index. Profanity rates were aggregated to the state level from the Study 2 Facebook profanity rates for
American participants.
Figure 2. Study 3: scatterplot presenting integrity and profanity rates across 50 U.S. states.
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dishonesty with an analysis of spoken and written language pat-
terns paves the way for more behavioral ethics research on
actual dishonest behavior in the field.
Unlike behavioral ethics, the study of profanity is still very
much in its infancy (Jay, 2009). Profanity is a much harder con-
struct to measure and even more difficult to effectively elicit or
manipulate, whether it is in the lab or in the field. The relatively
low use rates of profanity decrease even further when people
know that they are observed or that their behavior is studied.
Therefore, to be able to gain an understanding of profanity use,
it is important that the behavior observed is genuine and in nat-
uralistic settings. The current investigation has been able to
address this challenge by applying a linguistic analysis
approach to a unique large-scale naturalistic behavior data set.
The linguistic approach to detecting dishonesty used in
Study 2 has been used and verified in a number of previous
studies (e.g., Feldman et al., 2015; Slatcher et al., 2007). In
Study 2, the linguistic analysis showed that men tended to be
more dishonest than women, which is in line with a large body
of literature presenting similar findings (Childs, 2012; Dreber
& Johannesson, 2008; Friesen & Gangadharan, 2012). Also,
those with larger networks had a higher likelihood for dishon-
esty and a lower likelihood for profanity, which supports the
notion of dishonesty online as a means of creating a more
socially desirable profile. Both findings contribute to the con-
struct validity of the linguist honesty measure by demonstrating
previously established nomological networks. The consistency
in the direction and effect size of the profanity–honesty rela-
tionship across the three studies further raises confidence in this
approach to measuring dishonesty.
Extending to Society Level
Our research offers a first look at the use of profanity at a soci-
ety level. Using the large-scale sample of American partici-
pants from Study 2, we were able to calculate state-level
rates of profanity for use in Study 3. Addressing calls for psy-
chological research to attempt to examine the social implica-
tions of psychological findings (Back, 2015; Back & Vazire,
2015), we used this measure in order to examine whether the
positive relationship between profanity and honesty found at
the individual level could be extended to the society level. Such
an attempt involves many challenges, as there are many vari-
ables that may intervene or offer competing explanations for
a detected relationship. Yet we believe that this is an important
first attempt to provide a baseline for further investigation. The
consistent findings across the studies suggest that the positive
relation between profanity and honesty is robust and that the
relationship found at the individual level indeed translates to
the society level.
Implications and Future Directions
We briefly note several limitations in the current research and
these are further discussed in the Online Supplemental Materi-
als with implications and future directions. First, the three stud-
ies were correlational, thus preventing us from drawing any
causal conclusions. Second, the dishonesty we examined in
Studies 1 and 2 was mainly about self-promoting deception
to appear more desirable to others rather than blunt unethical
behavior. We therefore caution that the findings should not
be interpreted to mean that the more a person uses profanity,
the less likely he or she will engage in more serious unethical
or immoral behaviors. Third, the measures in Study 2 were
proxies using an aggregation of linguistic analysis of online
behavior using Facebook over a long period of time. Finally,
Simpson’s Paradox (Simpson, 1951) points to conceptual and
empirical differences in testing a relationship on different lev-
els of analysis, and therefore the state-level findings of Study 3
are conceptually broader than the findings in Studies 1 and 2.
These limitations notwithstanding, our research is a first step
in exploring the profanity–honesty relationship, and we believe
that the consistent effect across samples, methodology, and lev-
els of analysis contributes to our understanding of the two con-
structs and paves the way for future research. Future studies
could build on our findings to further study the profanity–hon-
esty relationship using experimental methods to establish causal-
ity and incorporating real-life behavioral measures with a wider
range of dishonest conduct including unethical behavior.
Conclusion
We set out to provide an empirical answer to competing views
regarding the relationship between profanity and honesty. In
Table 5. Summary of the Results.
#
Sample
Size Sample Type
Level of
Analysis Profanity Measure(s) Honesty Measure Effect
1 276 American English native
MTurk workers
Individual 1–2: Counts of written profanity
3: Self-report
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
Revised short scale
.20/.13/.34
2 73,789 English version Facebook
users
Individual Rate of profanity in language used
in status updates
Derivative of standard LIWC dimensions
(Newman, Pennebaker, Berry,
& Richard, 2003)
.20 (.22)
3 50 (48) States in the United States State Average profanity in language used
in status updates
State Integrity Investigation 2012 index .35 (.33)
Note. Effects in parentheses are effects while controlling for other factors (Study 2: age, gender, and network size; Study 3: spatial distance). LIWC ¼ Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count.
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three studies, at both the individual and society level, we found
that a higher rate of profanity use was associated with more
honesty. This research makes several important contributions
by taking a first step to examine profanity and honesty
enacted in naturalistic settings, using large samples, and
extending findings from the individual level to a look at the
implications for society.
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Notes
1. The Online Supplemental Materials include further details and a
report of the results using the original equation of negative emo-
tions including anger (r ¼ .02, p < .001; 95% CI [.01, .03]; with
controls: partial r ¼ .04, p < .001; 95% CI [.03, .05]).
2. We noted problems in using crime and conviction rates in the meth-
ods but ran several robustness checks. Higher state average of
profanity use was negatively correlated with state rates of property
crime (r ¼ .30, p ¼ .032), burglary (r ¼ .31, p ¼ .029), larceny
theft (r ¼ .34, p ¼ .015), and rape (r ¼ .24, p ¼ .093)—
obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation website.
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